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ABSTRACT
Navy Stock Fund working capital reductions can be primarily at-
tributed to vastly expensive but largely inactive safety stock
maintained in a decentralized storage system. By tracing through a
statistical method for determining the most economical quantity of
safety stock to maintain, inefficiencies in attempting to provide
equally high availabilities for all items of stock at local activit-
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The Navy Stock Fund is technically a "pool of money appropriated
from the General Fund of the United States and held on the books of the
Treasury Department .... "1 This is rather like describing an iceberg
as that small portion of a floating mass of ice that is visible above
the surface of the water. Various categories of material that have
been purchased from "the fund" would be hid en, lie the submerged
portion of an iceberg, by such a strict definition. These stores of
materials just referred to are carried in a suspense account known as
the Navy Stock Account until needed by consumer activities. Both the
Navy Stock Fund cash and Navy Stock Account inventories combine to make
up the working capital of a supply management concept that "represents
an effort to proviue room for business management within the framework
of a military organization. "2
The term "stock fund" has grown to' also mean the supply concept—
the structure, the cash, and the material inventories of this manage-
*U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Financial Manage-
ment in the Navy
,
Navpers 10792-A (1962), p. 178.
2Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1955), p. 316.

merit innovation. It is to the management of the total working capital
that this paper is directed.
A stock fund can, perhaps, b:st be described as a revolving fund
that finances a cycle of operations involving the purchase and sale of
an inventory of sup; lies. "The principal followed in the conduct of
stock funds is similar to commercial enterprise, except th^t there is
no sales promotion, and operations are conducted on a break-even basis. "*
It might be added that no sales promotion is required because the fund
is selling to a captive market, and there is generally only an approx-
imation to break-even operations.
Figure 1 ciepicts the revolving concept of a stock fund in general.
Common items of material are purchased with the funa's capital by stock
fund managers and distributed to the consu ers through established supply
channels. Appropriations are granted annually uy the Con ress as a
means for the consul iers--bureau8, offices, operating forces, etc.—to
carry out approved programs and activities. Upon withdrawal of supplies
from the Navy Stock Account to accomplish such a "proved programs and
activities, the annual appropriations of the customers are charged and
the capital of the fund is reimbursed. Funds generated in this manner
are used to procure additional inventory for the fund and complete a







































cycle of operations. Thus, the conversion of stock fund cash to in-
ventory, the sale of inventory Lo a customer, and the reimbursement
of stock fund cash by annual appropriation, in theory if not in fact,
perpetuates the Navy Stock Fund.
The only practical alternative to stock funds, if supplies and
materials are to be available when needed, is a "free-issue" system.
Such a system was used exclusively by the Army and Air Force prior to
the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 and still applies to the
bulk (at least from a monetary stanapoint) of supplies held by each of
the services today. Under this system, supplies are purchased initially
with end-use funds, carried in supply systems until required, and issued
with "statistical" charges to consumers. The Navy labels such stores
as Appropriation Purchases Account material.
Various writers, bent on governmental reform, have pointed out the
diseconomies associated with free-issue systems in the military depart-
ments. Abba P. Lerner, an eminent economist, once proposed that the
whole military establishment be organized in a network of markets that
would operate much as the American economy.^ Theater commanders would
4U.S., Title IV, Public Law 216, 81st Congress, dated 10 August 1949,
" Abba P. Lerner, Design for a streamlined ;Var Economy (Unpublished
Professional Paper, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass., 1942).

be granted allocations of money based upon the relative military worth
of their commands. They in turn would "bid" for the various supplies
and men with various skills would be adjusted according to the demand
for them. In this manner, the relative usefulness of various instru-
ments and skills could be determined for the supply managers and
training commands. It was contended that these actions and interactions
would lead to a more efficient- use of resources.
As Charles J. Hitch and Ho and McKean point out, stock funds are
but a "piecemeal approach" to Lerner's proposal. These authors,
while commenting on both the advantages and possible shortcomings of
stoci: funds, conclude that "the functioning of funds, like that of
private enterprise, does not have to be perfect in oraer to b€ more
7
efficient than alternative arrangements.
2. The Problem and Method of Study
The early success of the Navy Stock Fund in managing ordinary
commercial supplies is well known. Congress was so impressed with the
results of the Navy's stock fund operations that it granted the
Secretary of Defense authority in 1949 to direct the use of stock
Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 224.
7Ibid. t p. 226.

funds for financing inventories throughout the Department of Defense.
The Navy Stock Fund was expanded in 1957 to include technical re-
pair parts. With these spares cane an obsolescence problem, and
annual operating losses have been the rule rather than the exception
since that time. Congressional recissions in recent years and the
establishment of the Defense Supply Agency in 1961 have also had a
considerable impact upon the fund's operating capital.
The limitations of working capital have posed many problems
upon the Navy Stock Fund managers. Reduced procurement allotments
mean that supplies must be ordered in smaller quantities and oftener,
and such increases in workload must be met with a stable work force.
Shortages in procurement funds also mean a reduced availability of stocks
to meet variable demands and a curtailment of outfitting plans for new
programs
.
This study has attempted to determine, through a review of
various manuals, instructions, professional papers and the like which
are available in the library of this school or through informal
sources, the central issue of the current funding problem.
The approach taken in this paper was to (1) examine Department
of Defense and Navy Department policies with regard to Navy Stock Fund
inventory problems, (2) determine a focal point for managerial action,
and (3) surgest a possible approach to the problem uncovered.

3. Assumptions
It is assumed that obtaining adequate working capital to resolve
Navy Stock Fund financial problems through budgetary channels is not
possible under present conditions. The following comments b the
Comptroller of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts indicates this to
be the case:
The rapid uecline in cash was anticipated and efforts
were made during ^he past year to obtain cash augmentation
both through the appropriation process and by readjustment
of cash among the services and DSA stock funds. OSD is
aware of the problem, but has provided only limiteo cash
relief... The failure to restore NSF cash to previous levels
is no isolated action within DOD, but only the manifestation
of a basic OSD policy to reduce all working capital funds to
a bare minimum. It is now apparent that we .ire expected to
manage the fund with a minimum cash balance."
It is further assumed that current pricing policies for Navy Stock
Fund material are reasonable and that break- even prices for stocks
subject to a hi;ih obsolescence risk would be impractical. Research
revealed that the pro's and con's of our current policies on this
subject have already been thoroughly covered. The Department of
Defense policy on pricing is quoted:
._.
.surcharge rates should be established to include
potential losses on all current purchases .. .in addition,
8H. H. Hunt, "A New Dimension of Management in the Navy Stock Fund,"
(Bureau of Supplies and accounts Monthly Newsletter, May 1963), p. 11.

in event a surcharge rate would be unreasonably high because of
high estimated potential losses on current procurement of mobi-
lization reserve stocks, it will be permissable to establish a
reduced charre rate for each category or class to be established
shall include, as a minimum, estinated future losses on current
purchases of operating stocks.
^
It has been estimated, however, that surcharge rates in excess of
90% would be required to compensate for obsolescence in some segments
of material. One writer concluded recently that:
The present method of establishing surcharges for obsol-
escence is a compromise. The standard price includes a fact-
or applicable to an entire cate ory of material and is normally
applied only to those items procured for peacetime operating
stocks. Unofficially, the fear of excessive prices has es-
tablished a limit of 15% for all surcharges. All ships and
Naval activities have some local procurement authority and
must have. If the price of an item is higher than the price
for the same item from a commercial source, the temptation to
purchase locally is inversely proportional to the availabil-
ity of operating funds. ^
This assumption is not that the obsolescence problem in Navy Stock
Fund inventories should be ignored. If anything, the problem of
obsolescence should be brought out into the open more than it already
has been. Obsolescence is a relatively hidden cost in APA stocks.
No doubt many decisions have been made to make marginal improvements
in equipments, without due consideration of the effect on currently
9 U.S. Department of Defense, "Regulations Governing Stock Fund
Operations," DOD Directive 7420.1 of 19 December 1956, p. 11.
Robert D. Fisher, The Navy Stock Fund (Unpublished Master's Thesis,
George Washington University, Washington, D.C. , 1962), p. 43.

held spares. Purging APA stocks of such excesses is then termed good
inventory management. In the Navy Stock Fund, it would be an operat-
ing loss and receive considerably more management attention.
4. Limitation of the Study
The subject of military essentiality has been carefully avoided
throughout^ this paper. There can be no question that economic
considerations alone should not govern our inventory policies.







And the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
and directed to cause | eneral account of auvances to be charged
with the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, which amount
shall be carried to the credit of a permanent naval supply
fund to be used tinder the direction of the secretary of the
Navy in the purchase of ordinary commercial supplies for the
naval service, and to be reimbursed from the proper naval
appropriations whenever the supplies purchased under said fund
are issued for use.
It is not the purpose of this paper to describe the history of the
Navy Stock Funu since its establishment in 1893. Such efforts would
be trite since several articles and papers have already been written
on this subject from a historical and legislative point of vieu.^
It is deemed necessary, however, to briefly summarize several
historical developments of the past few years that have affected
stock fund operations to a considerable degree.
2. Congressional Recessions
One of the features of the stock fund concept that has impressed
Congress is the ease with which they can control the overall investment
1 U.S., 27 Stat. 723, Act of March 3, 1893
^See History of the Navy Stock Fund and Naval Stock Account, 1945





levels of Navy Stock Fund inventories. Congress has certainly, jased this
feature in the recent past. Congressional recissions totaled 1.3
billion dollars from 1954 to 1963.
Many of the earlier diversions of cash were no doubt justified.
The Navy emerged from the Korean conflict with large excesses of stock
fund material. During this time there were also advancements in inven-
tory management techniques, and large numbers of stock points had
mechanized their stock records.
The capitalization of repair parts in 1957 also generated surplusses
that caught the eye of Congress even though some operating losses were
apparently caused by these transfers. One writer states:
The capitalization of repair parts inventories had the
immediate affect of generating surplusses and items, in long
supply. Even though these materials had been subject to Navy-
wide reporting and centralized inventory management .. .there
had been no compelling reasons to eliminate the surplusses
that existed. Storage space was a '^able and the materials
were paid for. They represente< .. operating and capital
assets which could be utilize;. ~ suj lement funds. Upon
capitalization into the Navy Stock Fund, they became subject
to the revolving fund concept. These stocks, if not active,
reduced the e£-iciency of the system and it was no longer
economically f i asible to retain them. Hence many were declar-
ed excess and sold. The losses were absorbed by the fund.
Congress, on the other hanu , apparently felt chat, in
spite of these losses, the money which had been appropriated
to purchase these materials originally should be returned to
the Treasury or ma«.e available for other uses by reapprop-
reation. The net result is that today the supply of a con-







More recently, ho.ever, recissions have een initiated ty the
Department of Defense to secure monies for other programs. The
operating capital of the fund is, no doubt, now competing with the
alternate uses to which such funds can be placed.
3. Extensions of NSF Coverage
Available evidence points to the fact that the extension of
Navy stock Funo coverage into the area of spare parts was done with
considerable deliberation and care. Planning for the expansion
dates back to the post-World War II days.
Following World war II, a comprehensive study of the
entire Navy supply system was inaugurated, based on World
War II experience. The recommendations of those making the
study were incorporated in a document known as the Navy
Supply Plan.
The Navy Supply Plan proposed a single fund procurement
as the most efficient method of obtaining and maintaining
replenishable stocks...
The Navy Stock Fund and Navy btock Account had all the
essentials of such a single fund and single account, but the
plan was never fully implemented in this respect.
Department of Defense policy at that time provided the following
broad guidelines with regard to authorized inclusions of coverage for
stock funds:
1. All material procured and/or stored for supply purposes.
This is intended to include all consumable tyoes of material
4John W. Hempstead, MA Study of the Navy Stock Fund, 1893-1952" (Un-





and relatively minor items of equipment, including parts and
components used in the manufacture, assembly, maintenance or
rebuild of end-items for the military supply system. The
term "consumable*' material is used in the sense of covering
all material which may be considered to be expended to operat-
ing and maintenance appropriations when withdrawn from stock
funds for use. However, no hard and fast definition may be
drawn.
*
An "Ad Hoc Committee to Examine Methods and Procedures for Mater-
ial Requirements Determination and Budgeting Therefor" also recommend-
ed in 1955 that the Navy Stock Fund be extended to APA repair parts
inventories. 6 This committee pointed out that all the items to be in-
cluded were not necessarily subject to rapid turnover and that rate of
stock turn was not an adeouate criterion to measure the effectiveness
of the stock fund for such items.
Authorization was obtained and the decision was made to transfer
repair parts to the Navy Stock Fund effective 1 July 1957. Since
that time, operating losses because of increased obsolescence have had
a pronounced effect upon the operating capital of the Navy Stock Fund.
4. The Defense Supply Agency
The establishment of the Defense Supply Agency in 1961 had a very
profound effect upon the Navy Stock Fund, both from a financial and
5U.S., Department of Defense, "Principles to be Observed in Determining





an operational viewpoint. DSA assumed the responsibility for procure-
ment and supply management for a considerable number of repetitive demand,
type items which are used by two or more of the services. These items
that are purchased and held by DSA are termed wholesale stocks. The
individual services use their own funds (Navy Stock Fund or end-use
appropriations) to obtain commodities from DSA. Items that are pur-
chased with NSF monies and placed in the Navy Stock Account are termed
retail stocks.
This transfer of cognizance reduced the number of items over which
Navy ICP's exercised the inventory control functions by about one half.
For those items that were transferred to the Defense Supply Agency
control, the Navy no longer lias inventory control points to conuuct
supply demand reviews, to "push" materials to stock points and relocate
system stocks or to direct the disposition of excesses. These functions
for DSA mana ;ed items fell on the relatively unprepared shoulders of
supply departments at activities throughout the supply system.
Both cash and inventories were required to be tra £ rr .6 to the
newly established Defense Stock Fund in 1962 and 1963. The transfer of
cash was, of course, a direct loss of procurement funds. The transfer
of inventories not only reduced the corpus of the Navy Stock Fund but
also eliminated the prospects of cash generations from the sale of these
formerly Navy owned assets.
14

Following the changes mentioned was a rather severe reduction in
the inventory investment allowed at Navy stock points. Activities
stocking a significant amount of materials in the various DSA commodity
groups were granted specific Navy Stock Fund allotments for the pro-
curement of DSA materials.
The following is a summary of the situation created at local
activities by these various changes:
Navy Stock Funds are parceled out by BuSandA to the
Navy Retail Offices (FMSO, NSO, NC&TO, ESO, FSO). The NRO's
establish broad guidelines which include the maximum re-
quisitioning objective, maximum operating level, safety level,
and funded investment level. The former two can be locally
decreased and the latter two cannot be changed in any manner.
The safety level (for CONUS activities) is one month and the
funded investment level is 2§ multiplied by the average
monthly money value of issues...
The rationale which establishes the funded investment
level is bas; d on a five-month requisitioning objective.
This would yield a maximum on hand stock position (stockage
objective) of four months (immediately upon receipt of an
order), to one month (immediately prior to receipt of an order) .
Theoretically, on hand balances \;ill vary from one month to
four months for an average on hand stock level of 2\ months.
Funds are granted on this basis.^
As might be expected, demands do not always behave the way the
theoretical sawtooth inventory models would depict them. Demands for
^L. W. Gorenflo, "The Challenge of Local Inventory Control" (Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts Monthly Newsletter, August 1964), p. 14.
15

some items that were stocked failed to materialize and there were
recuirements to stock "new" items on the basis of recorded demand.
At an activity operating on a fixed-month recuisitioning objective for
all items of stock, as many manual activities were, decreasing the
requisitioning objective for all stocks to release funds for other
purposes would greatly increase the ordering -orkload. It can be shown
mathematically in such cases that to decrease the investment in stocks
by 20% requires 50% increase in the number of orders placed. This
situation, no doubt, greatly increased the interest in scientific
inventory management.
5. Variable Stock Levels
Although economic order quantity formulas have been utilized at
ICP's and major stock points for some time, the recent development of
a Variable Stock Level (V3L) program by the Fleet Material Support
Office^ for use at mechanized supply activities appears to be the most
notable recent achievement in this area, since it provides a great
number of lesser stock points with a tool to maximize their supply
effectiveness.
The VSL program appears to have incorporated practically all the
latest theoretical innovations of scientific inventory management and
®U.S., Navy Department, Navy Fleet Material Support Office, Variable
Stock Level Program (Preliminary Draft) 1 July 1964 and EAM Version
(Preliminary Draft) 1 September 1964.
16

coupled them with the practical aspects of "the real world."
The VSL program makes no attempt to reduce the total variable
costs of inventory control by equating the variable costs to order
with holding costs. This appears to be very practical since almost all
of the variable costs to order are made up of salaries. The program,
in effect, assumes a constant personnel ceiling and allocs each activ-
ity to choose a reasonable number of orders that can be placed under
this fixed workforce. The advantages of decreased inventory investments
are gained by mathematically computing the "correct" number of months
of stock to carry for individual line items based upon their annual
monetary demands within the constraint of a fixed anni al number of
orders to be placed.
Another feature of the VSL program is thatthe mathematical
formulas to comoute optimum stocking rules are tailored to the
individual activities. This may be an unnecessary refinement if there
is no great variation in the characteristics of inventories throughout
the system. Tailoring the program does, however, require an annual
recomputation of each individual activity»s program. From this
standpoint, the individual tailoring is extremely beneficial for control
purposes. It is an accepted fact that any control device must receive
feedback and be able to make adjustments if it is to be effective.
The FMSO VSL program can be considered a significant step forward
17

in selective item management. It is designed to get the most out of
every procurement dollar under current budgetary constraints. Good as
it is, however, it does not help to get additional procurement funds
or to justify retention of present safety levels of slow-moving stock.
Unfortunately, too, it does not assist those manual supply activities




1. The Central Issue
There are numerous problems that are present in Navy Stock Fund
operations. Many of these problems seem so interrelated that it is
difficult to single out any particular one and examine it closely.
The range of items to be covered by the fund, for example, has always
been a problem. If parts are not stock funded and are required to be
¥
on hand when needed, they are procured and carried as .Appropriation
Purchases Account material--the so-called free-issue system. The
Navy is then criticized for waste that results from the lack of any
incentives to restrict the use or hoarding of these items. If these
particular parts are included in the Navy Stock Fund, obsolescence
rears its ugly head and the revolving concept of the fund is threaten-
ed. It has been shown that it is virtually impossible to recover ex-
pected obsolescence losses through a break-even pricing policy. Such
a policy would reduce the buying power of the fleet and create a
strong need for additional operating funds in that area. Also, if such
items do not maintain an adequate stock turn ratio, there is pressure
exerted from DOD to reduce the inventory investments.
It has become apparent to the writer that most of the Navy Stock
Funds' financial problems can be attributed to the vast amount of
19

investment required in safety stocks, particularly for insurance items,
to maintain a high degree of material availability in locations near
consumers.
It is an established fact that most categories of stock fund
material are composed of only a few items that are subject to rapid
turnover. The majority of items have low demand rates and relatively
unpredictable demand patterns. As a result, the inventory investment
that is required at each supply activity to maintain a high degree of
stock availability is tremendous.
In a rather cogent article—centered around the costs of provid-
ing logistics support—Commander H. F. Mills, SC, USN, a frequent
contributor of professional articles in the field of supply management,
analyzed the stock levels, in terms of months of supply, necessary to
provide various levels of availability for a group of slow moving Navy
Stock Fund repair parts.l Actual demand data for a sample of 100 of
these insurance type items was taken from the records of the Ships
Parts Control Center, a Navy Inventory Control Point. The average
demand for each of the items in the sample was one unit per quarter.
Commander Mills computed that a three months supply of stock (as
H. F. Mills, "Uncertainty in Logistics" (Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
Monthly Newsletter , May 1963), pp. 7-10.
20

measured by average monthly usage) for each of these items provided
only a projected 36% availability for the demand distributions involved.
Twelve months of stock for each item provided only 82% availability
and 18 months* worth of stock would be required to provide a 95%
availability goal.
Commander Mills purpose in writing this particular article was
apparently twofold. First, he pointed out the fallacy of planning,
stocking, and budgeting in terms of weeks or months of supply for a
large number of items currently carried in inventories. Second, he
attempted to show the merits of a performance (in terms of supply
availability) vice a conventional procurement budget. This writer
agrees completely with the first point and also agrees with the concept
of the second. His statement regarding 18 months of stock for these
items of low demand that "the budget-preparing activity knows from
experience that this is what it takes"2 does seem rather heroic.
Given an administratively assigned 95% availability goal, Commander
Mills is correct. The point is, however, that we do not know on a
rational basis how sound such a goal really is.
Perhaps some additional feeling for the problem of attempting to





equipments can be gained from the following:
Nowadays, when a new ship slides down the ways, much of
its equipment is already obsolete in terms of another ship
still under construction, and, to further complicate the
problem, whole equipments and systems installations are re-
placed on commissioned ships, during and even between ship-
yard overhauls, in a continuing race to stay abreast of ex-
ploding weapons technology.
The resulting conglomeration of equipments provides a
"messy" support problem. For example, in one category of
material (installed machinery), the Ship's Parts Control
Center maintains allowance parts lists for 110,000 different
equipments. 46,000 of these lists provide itemizations of
repair part support for equipments which are installed on
only one Navy ship. 75,000 of these lists are applicable to
equipments which are installed on 4 or less ships.
Viewed from another angle, in terms of individual re-
pair part items, some 95% of the ordnance repair parts in the
system have application in only one navy equipment (although
that equipment may be installed in more than one ship).
If we contrast this situation with that of the Air Force,
where aircraft production runs are usually in the hundreds or
thousands and the number of different types of aircraft in
operations at any one moment in time is relatively small, we
get some idea of the uniqueness of the Navy problem. And the
problem can only get worse. Ships will get fewer. Technolog-
ical change will occur even more rapidly, and equipment "use-
ful lives" will grow shorter. Along with these changes, it is
safe to assume that more complex equipments will require more
numerous and more expensive repair part items to achieve a
given degree of operational readiness. 5
Lenz goes further to suggest that our supply system may not be
operating as efficiently as it should be. Specifically, he deals
A.J. Lenz, "Is the Waterfront Supply Depot Obsolete?" (Unpublished







with a comparison of the present decentralized storage policy for some
400,000 insurance-type repair parts versus a hypothetical central stor-
age policy. No doubt there are now many items within the 400,000 that
would prove to be more efficiently administered through a central depot.
As the speed and service of communication and premium transportation
facilities improve and as the costs for such services decrease, we should
find an increasingly convincing argument for more central storage with
its inventory reduction implications. Among the indicators of ineffic-
iency that Lenz discovered are the following:
1. There are 1.65 demands generated within the mass of spare
parts for every issue that is made
—
perhaps evidence that a great deal
of the supply system's effort is to support itself. One would certainly
expect that the number of demands would at least approximate the number
of issues in a decentralized system. The ,65 differential in these
two figures indicates a relatively low success rate in satisfying
demands at the first stock point tried—in fact, such point-of-entry
availabilities were computed to range from only 60% for IN cog mater-
ial to 68.9% for 1A cog material.
2. There was an issue/receipt ratio of only 2.87; i.e., this
whole segment of the supply system makes only 2.87 issues for each
receipt transaction. This indicates that there must already be a large
number of single item shipments—a rather startling fact when consider-
ing that our decentralized storage policies are based, at least in part,
23

upon the economies of scale in the transportation of material to a
position near consumers. The statistics also reveal that approximately
one third of the total issues involved are to "other Navy activities"
and do not necessarily involve an issue to the ultimate user.
Such statistics must be tempered by the fact that stock fund
procurement authorizations have not been what we would have desired the
past few years. It seems fair, however, to assume that carryovers of
inventory from the "good old days" provided lar er stocks of these
items than the budgeteers would be currently willing to finance. The
point that these statistics can only get worse as the funding gap widens
and an economic analysis of our stocking policies seems to be indicated
that could justify our position or change our attitude.
The funding implications of our administratively assigned inventory
service goals (more recently these have been determined solely by budget-
ary constraints) can rightfully be questioned.
Service levels in the past have been administratively set. Many
writers on the subject of inventory control state that this is probably
the best approach. Most conclude that it is the responsibility of
management to administratively determine the level of service, tempered
by the cost, that it desires to offer. Perhaps this is a good approach
in the commercial world where competition and industry standards set a
floor on service policies. In the Navy Stock Fund, however, it leaves
24

something to be desired. There are no industry standards and no com-
petition to serve as a benchmark for the budgeteers that approve fund-
ing plans.
...Resources are always limited in comparison with our wants,
always constraining our action. (If they did not, we could
do everything, and there would be no problem of choosing pre-
ferred courses of action.) As a consequence, resource limit-
ations are often called constraints. We try to achieve the
most desirable outcome that is possible in view of these con-
straints. 5
It should be obvious by now that the Department of Defense and
Bureau of the Budget analysts place little worth in administratively
assigned inventory service goals. At least the current funding
policies for the Navy Stock Fund indicate that they do not. Put an-
other way, it appears that we must reevaluate how much safety stock
we can actually justify on the basis of the item characteristics.
We must also be able to justify economically where these stocks are
placed.





AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
...To help predict the consequences of alternative policies
and practices, we may use models on paper, models in our
heads, models in the form of games, or simulation laborator-
ies to represent the functioning of logistics systems. In
any event, the alternatives should be considered in terms of
an economic criterion.
It appears that if the Navy Stock Fund managers are to ever
reverse the trend of reductions in working capital, some method of
determining the most economic safety levels of stock for every supply
activity in the whole system must be developed. Research reveals that
several methods of determining least cost stocking policies have been
propounded by various authors in the fields of statistics and math-
ematics. Of these the techniques of Robert Schaffer, a subjective
statistician, are the easiest to comprehend by this writer and will
be explored somewhat in an attempt to determine the adequacy of
current procedures for establishing safety levels of stock.
All of these methods require that the inventory manager know
something of the demand distribution for each of the items in an
Hitch and McKean, op. cit
. , p. 281.
^See James W. Pritchard and Robert H. Eagle, Modern Inventory Management
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965) for a mathematical approach.
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inventory—the probability that various quantities of an item will be
demanded. A number of techniques have been developed to give the
inventory manager this capability at mechanized activities so we will
assume that this poses no great problem.
Another requirement for utilizing these least cost methods is
some knowledge of two cost parameters—the costs that are incurred
if an item is not available when we need it (shortage cost) and the
cost that is incurred if too much stock is carried over lead time (cost
of overage). It is the inability of inventory managers to estimate
these cost parameters accurately that has apparently prevented even
the consideration of least cost safety levels in the past. The writer
will suggest later how we might overcome some of these difficulties.
For the benefit of readers not familiar with Schlaifer's techniques,
and to emphasize some relationships for those who are, a simple exam-
ple of his methods will be presented. Lead time—the time required
to receive stock after an order is placed—will be assumed to be a
f
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constant of one month in this example to simplify the presentation.
It might be added that the writer envisions the use of these
methods only in establishing reorder points for fast moving items and
safety levels for insurance stocks at each echelon of the stock fund
distribution system. Various EOQ methods are considered to be the best




1. Incremental Analysis and Probability
The technique of combining incremental analysis with probability
theory requires the use of the concept of expected value (or expected
loss). The definition of expected value is given below. Its mean-
ing should become clear from an example that is to follow.
. ..
Expected value of an act: a weighted average of all the
conditional values of an act, each conditional value being
weighted by its probability.^
Let us assume that we are dealing with an item that has a unit
cost of $10.00 and we h^ve determined that four months stock is an
economic order quantity. It will also be assumed that the shortage
cost per unit is $1.50 and the cost of overage is $.50 per unit.
Table I shows the hypothetical demand history for this item of
inventory.
A decision on reorder point levels can be analyzed incrementally
by thinking of the decision as being the result of not a direct choice
of providing 80% or 90% service, but as a result of a whole sequence
of decisions, each of which increases the stock level by one unit.
The principal followed is to decide whether the first unit should be
stocked. If it should, then the second unit is "analyzed. The whole
^Robert Sclaifer, Introduction to Statistics for Business Decisions





for an Inventory Item
Probability that Probability that
demand is 1 ess demand is equal
Demand Probability of Z than z to or greater than Z
Z P(Z) P(Z < Z) P(Z > Z)
.05 .00 1.00
1 .10 .05 .95
2 .20 .15 .85
3 .30 .35 .65
4 .20 .65 .35
5 .10 .85 .15
6 .05 .95 .05





range of possible quantities is examined in serial order until the
point is reached where it costs more to stock one particular unit
than it does not to stock it.
To find the costs that we would expect to incur if we do not
stock the first unit, we multiply the probability that the demand will
be greater than or equal to one unit (.95) by the expected cost of not
stocking that unit ($1.50). The result of a decision not to stock the
first unit would be an expected cost of $1.43. Similarly, if we mult-
iply the probability that less than one unit will be demanded (.05)
by the cost of overage for that unit ($,50), we find that the expected
cost if we do stock the first item is only $.03. Obviously, we should
stock at least one of these items since our expected cost is less if
we stock than it is if we do not.
We now multiply the probability that demand will be greater than
or equal to two units (.85) by the shortage cost and get $1.28 for an
expected cost of not stocking the second unit. The expected cost if
we do stock the second unit is .15 times $.50 or $.08. We should also
stock the second unit.
We continue making computations through the fourth unit and find
that it is still advantageous to stock that unit.
For the fifth unit, the probability of demand being greater than
or equal to five units is only .15. Multiplying that probability
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by the shortage cost, we arrive at an expected cost of $.23 if we do
not stock the fifth unit. The probability that demand will be less
than five (.85) times the cost of overage yields an expected cost of
$.43 if we do stock that unit. Since the expected cost of stocking is
greater than the expected cost of not stocking, it is not profitable to
stock the fifth unit. Only four units of stock over lead time can be
justified on economic grounds.
Computations for the entire example are shown as Table II. The
reader will notice that the total expected loss of stocking the first
four units ($.03 + $.08 + $.17 + $.33) plus the expected loss of not
stocking units five and six ($.23 and $.08) is smaller than for any
other combination of stock/do not stock possibilities.
An observation of columns three and five of Figure 2 will also
show that each successive expected cost of net stocking is smaller than
the preceding one and each successive cost of stocking is greater than
the preceding one.
It would be difficult to compare the results of our computations
with all the current procedures for computing reorder points. The
FMSO V3L program, for example, utilizes the annual dollar demand of
an item along with deviations in unit demand and lead time to compute
reorder points. At manual activities, however, reorder points and




Expected Costs of Not Stocking
versus
Stocking Decisions
J P(Z 2= J) $1.50 x P(Z 2r J) P(Z < J) $.50 x P(
1.00 $1.50 .00 $.00
1 .95 1.43 .05 .03
2 .85 1.28 .15 .08
3 .65 .97 .35 .18
4 .35 .53 .65 .33
5 .15 .23 .85 .43
6 .05 .08 .95 .48




The average monthly demand for the item represented by Table I
can be computed to be three units per month. At manual activities
this would mean that the reorder point would be established at six
units—three to cover expected demand over lead time and three for
safety stock. The four unit reorder point in our example is composed
of three units to cover expected demand and only one unit of safety
stock.
Of course we would expect that safety levels would also increase
for some items if warranted by economic considerations and the demand
distribution. Safety levels of stock would be reduced for items with
a relatively constant demand and increased for stocks with extreme
variances in demand. Those factors, however, would be tempered con-
siderably by the relationship of shortage costs to the costs of over-
age.
Whether the overall investment in safety stocks would increase
or decrease and to what extent is not really the criterion that should
be used in evaluating the worth of incremental analysis in setting
reorder points and safety stock levels. The important point is that
safety levels would be established on a rational and economic basis.
If realistic cost estimates of shortage costs and overage costs can be
made, then we would expect a safety level policy based upon incremental
analysis to be the least costly policy in the long run.
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2. The Critical Ratio
It must be admitted that it would be impractical to attempt to
perform the calculations that we just performed for all the items in
a large inventory. There is, however, a short-cut method of determin-
ina an economical order point. It can be used whenever the shortage
cost and the cost of overage are linear over the entire range of stock-
ing choices. Perhaps this situation is prevalent in the area of low-
demand insurance stocks.
It can be shown algebraically in such cases that the least cost
reorder point is represented by the following notation:^"
Ku
P(Z <= J) < Ku + Ko
Where:
P(Z <;j) = Probability that demand will be less than some particular
serial unit.
Ku = Shortage cost
Ko = Cost of overage
The best reorder point can be selected by the following steps:
1. Determine (a) the cost Ko that results from stocking one unit
that will not be issued and (b) the cost Ku that results from the fail-
ure to stock one unit that was needed.
Ku
2. Compute a "critical ratio"—Ku + Ko .






In our example, the critical ratio is:
Ku
_ $1.50 _
Ku + Ko $1.50 + $ .50 " '
Looking down the list of values in the column headed P(Z <• J) in
Table I, we see that .65 is the highest value in which the probability
is less than the critical ratio. This value applies to serial unit
number four. We therefore conclude that the most economical reorder
point for this particular item is four units. The result also agrees
with our computations of the best reorder point in Table II.
Some interesting observations can be made if one considers the
critical ratio formula carefully. Perhaps some of these observations
are rather obvious, but it would appear that any personnel responsible
for setting inventory service goals should be completely familiar with
the cost implications.
1. Any attempt to provide 100% supply availabilities—already
generally recognized as prohibitive from an investment standpoint--
would be justified only if there were no cost penalties associated
with carrying too much stock. Conversely, if there were no penalties
associated with a shortage or if the critical ratio were at least as
high as the probability that zero units of stock would be demanded,
there would be no economic justification to carry any stock of that
item.
2. When the cost of overage and the shortage cost are equal, no
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safety stock can be justified on economic grounds alone. The critical
ratio of .50 obtained in such a case would indicate that only an
amount of stock equal to the average demand over lead time should be
considered.
3. A shortage costs that is double the cost of overage would allow
us to protect against only two thirds of the possible demands over lead
time.
4. Shortages costs four times the cost of overage would justify
a service policy of just under 80%. A 90% service policy would require
that the shortage cost be more than nine times greater than the cost of
overage.
Figure 2 is a graphical presentation of the ratio of a single
item's shortage cost to its cost of overage (not the critical ratio)
related to the approximate inventory service levels that can be
justified on economic grounds.
3. Estimating Demand Distributions
It was mentioned previously that mechanized supply activities
have a general capability to predict an item's demand distribution.
Manual activities do not. The vast amount of hand calculations that
would be required to compute mean or standard deviations to determine
demand distributions for all items of stock would be prohibitive.
Schlaifer offers a simple method of estimating the demand distribution
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that may be useful at such manual activities.
If a sample of n observations is drawn from some distribution
and arrayed in order of size the kth observation is a reason-
able estimate of the
(n + -\\
fractile of the distribution.
This merely means that if the last nine monthly demands for some
particular item are observed, the smallest of those monthly demands is
a reasonable estimate of the 1/10 fractile (representing 10% of the
cumulative distribution) of that item's distribution of demands. The
second smallest demand is a reasonable estimate of the 2/10 fractile
(20% of the cumulative distribution). The seventh smallest would re-
present 70% of the cumulative demand.
To obtain a graphical presentation of the cumulative demand for
some particular item, the past demands can be plotted on graph paper
and a less than or equal to curve fitted to the points. As a matter
of interest, a normal demand distribution would appear as an "S-shaped"
cumulative distribution on the graph. The correct reorder point or
number to stock over lead time, to integrate our previous discussion,
can be found by proceeding from the vertical axis scaled in terms of
probability or relative frequency along the critical ratio value to the
plotted curve. We then proceed down from that point to the horizontal




But it appears that plotting a curve .ould not be required in a
large number of cases, particularly if we were dealing with items that
had a small range of demands. Instead, the correct values could be
mentally computed.
To investigate the potential of such a method for estimating a
demand distribution, the writer generated five random samples of nine
months demand each from a distribution similar to that contained in
Table I. These demands are presented in Table III. Note that for an
item with a critical ratio of .75, the reorder point for each group
would be the seventh rank ordered demand:
K 7 = .70
n + 1 9+1
The probability that demand will be less than or equal to the
seventh rank ordered number is .70 and this is the largest cumulative
probability of a whole number that is less than our previously computed
ratio of .75. Using these estimates, we would have set our reorder
points at five, four, four, three, and four respectively, for the five
samples. This compares reasonably well with the reorder point of four
that we computed for this demand previously with the actual demand known,
The* first two of these random generations of demand are plotted
in Figure 3 to allow a visual comparison with the "true" demand for
this item.




Estimates of Cumulative Demand Distributions
Based Upon Rank-Ordering Recorded Demands
Fractile R A U-JL ORDERED S A M P L E S*
Estimate #1 #2 #3 #4 #5
.10 2
.20 2 1 1 1
.30 2 2 2 2
.40 3 2 2 3
.50 3 3 2 3 2
.60 4 3 3 3 3
.70 5 4 4 3 4
.80 6 4 4 5 5
.90 6 4 5 6 6
*A11 five samples were randomly generated from the
same probability distribution shown in Table I.
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demand, this method of estimating demand distributions would allow
some application of a variable safety stock program aL manual supply
activities.
4. Cost Considerations
The cost of a shortage is always composed of intangible ele-
ments as well as tangible which make the estimation of short-
age cost even more difficult than the estimation of order
cost or holding rate."
The writer can accept the above quoted statement as a fact. Never-
theless, it seems worth trying if we are ever to reverse the current
downward trend in Navy Stock Fund working capital . It should be noted
that early attempts by Navy activities to implement Wilson-type EOQ
formulas resulted in some rather questionable order cost and holding
cost figures. Some of the order costs used in these formulas at dif-
ferent activities varied from $5.40 to $725.00. Needless to say,
many of these activities were forced to reduce the order quantities
computed in such a haphazard manner by an arbitrary factor to stay
within budgetary constraints. But such earlier attempts did pave the
way to selective item management at these locations by pointing out
the line items that, from an economical standpoint, required r&anage-
Janes W. Pritchard and Robert H. Eagle, Modern Inventory Management (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 143.
'Frank N. Wordon, "The Parameters of Inventory Management Decisions"




Also like the values for holding costs and ordering costs in EOQ
formulas, shortage costs and the costs of overage need not be precise
in a critical ratio to yield workable results. The reader is reminded
of the earlier discussion of the critical ratio of .75 where:
Shortage Cost = $1.50 = .75
Shortage Cost + Holding Cost $1.50 + $.50
For the particular demand distribution that was used in Table II,
any critical ratio between .65 and .85 would have yielded the same
most economical reorder point of four. A shortage cost of $1.01 and
a cost of overage of $.50 yields a critical ratio of .66. Using a
shortage cost of $2.80 vice $1.50 would have also kept us within the
.66 to .85 range. The point is that cost perameters need not be per-
fect to yield beneficial results.
It seems appropriate to turn to the field of managerial econ-
omics for an examination of the cost parameters involved in either
a shortage or overage of material. There is an important difference
between the costs that an economist recognizes and those that are re-
flected in accounting records. An accountant is generally concerned
with the allocation of all expenses in an organization to some end
product for profit and loss computation. In contrast to an accountant,




The cost involved in any decision consists of the sac-
rifices of alternatives required by that decision. If
there are no sacrifices, there is no cost. 8
One basic idea in the so-called field of managerial economics is
that the definition of costs must be adapted to the particular decision
at hand. Clearly, this does involve judgment and may lead to varying
conclusions from different people. ^ careful analysis of the situation,
however, can often reduce these variances to an acceptable range.
Table IV, a summary of economic cost concepts, is intended to
establish a frame of reference with the reader in discussing the costs
that are appropriate for the decision at hand. One writer's comments
regarding the ordering costs and the holding costs in EOQ formulas
that "such data as have been generated have been summarily rejected as
a basis for justifying budget requirements by both the Department of
Defense and Bureau of the Budget... "^ seems to indicate the need for
such a benchmark.
It will help in the following discussion if we assume that (1)
all supply activities currently operating will continue to do so and
(2) there will be a considerable range and depth of stock on hand at
all times.
°W. W. Haynes, Managerial Economics—Analysis and Cases (Ilomewood,
Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1963), p. 31.





















To assure full recognition of op-
portunity costs whether or not ex-
plicitly recognized in the formal
accounting records.
To separate costs that vary with in-
creased or decreased volume from
those that do not
.
To separate those costs that will be
affected by a decision from those





To assure recognition of both, and em-
phasis being given the most relevant.
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With these concepts and assumptions in mind, the various factors that
make up shortage and overage costs will be discussed.
At first blush, one might list the following factors as contribut-
ing to a shortage cost
:
1. The cost to the consumer of a delay in delivery.
2. Salaries of personnel that must place an interim order.
3. The cost of transmitting an order.
4. The salaries of warehousing personnel at the supplying
activity.
5. Transportation costs.
6. Salaries of receiving personnel.
Of these items, the cost to a customer of a delay in an item's
delivery is the most difficult to measure. Such a cost would depend
upon circumstances that only a local activity could determine. But
what if the material were available from local commercial sources or
could be furnished in a matter of a short time from some other supply
activity? The incremental cost in the first case would be the differ-
ence in price between the Navy Stock Fund standard price and the dealer's
price. In the second case, if material were delivered approximately
as soon, there would possibly be no cost or delay to the customer in-
volved.
Salaries of ordering, warehousing, and receiving personnel, it is
suggested, are fixed costs. Personnel ceilings at supply activities
are financed from operations and maintenance or military personnel

appropriations. Both the ceilings and the appropriations are largely
independent of inventory management policies. If there were a tremendous
increase in orders (if a critical ratio service system were adopted) the
costs involved would be the value of functions that were given up by
shifting personnel to the job of ordering. Until proven otherwise, it
would seem appropriate to assume that no vast change in workload would
take place and there would be no increased costs in these functions.
Communications expenses also appear to be fixed. Stock points are
now utlizing a rapid data transmission network to pass requisitions on
to report transactions. Any change in the number of individual trans-
missions would not affect the cost of communications.
The cost of transportation should be limited to the difference
between "normal" transportation charges and the premium transportation
to be utilized in obtaining priority shipments if materials were not
on hand when needed.
The costs of overage can be analyzed in a similar manner. It is
suggested that there would be no increase in the number of warehousing
personnel, security or Janitorial expenses, or in the cost of heating
or lighting a warehouse to accommodate material that was not issued in
a normal procurement cycle.
The costs that do seem to be affected by a stocking decision are:
1. An interest charge on the inventory investment.
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2. The expected cost of obsolescent.
3. Physical deterioration of stock.
The interest charge is the easiest to compute. The Department of
Defense has specified that an interest rate of four percent*" will be
used for inventory management purposes. Some might argue that this
charge should be higher to reflect what these dollars would earn if they
were not collected in taxes. One DSA activity, for example, used a 14
percent "time preference rate"11 in their EOQ formulas to reflect the
average rate of return on investment in the American economy. This
writer, as a regular purchaser of savings bonds, can rationalize and
accept the four percent rate that is specified.
The risk of obsolescence can roughly be determined by using the
recipro-al of the expected useful life of an item, or in the case of a
spare part, of its major equipment. For example, the obsolescence charge
for an item with an expected life of 10 years can be estimated as 1/10
or .10.
Our intuition should tell us that the charge for deterioration
would be very small for most items. Supplies with a definite shelf life
would be relatively ea.sy to assign a charge for deterioration to.
10U.S. Department of Defense, "Peacetime Operating and Safety Levels of
Supply", DOD Instruction 4140.11 of 24 June 1958.
11U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency, DSA Material Manage-
ment System Requirements Study, July 1963, p. 75.
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What we have come up with so far in determining the cost of over-
age is really the same "cost to hold" that is used in EOQ formulas. Of
course, we have eliminated some costs as fixed that many businesses do
(and should) include in this rate.
This holding cost should be tempered for the amount of time that
an item is subject to being in an overstocked position, namely once in
an order cycle. For items that are ordered on an annual basis, we run
the risk the whole year that the last item or the last few will not be
demanded after reaching the reorder point. If the order cycle is quarter-
ly, only one fourth of the annual holding cost should apply since the
period of risk is shorter.
5. A Model
To be realistic, it must be admitted that the cost of a delay in
the delivery of an item to a customer cannot be determined very accurate-
ly in most cases. There is still a wide range of locally procurable
items that would involve no such cost. There are also numerous expens-
ive but lightweight repair parts that could be delivered from another
supply activity with no appreciable delay. It is suggested that the
other costs involved can be estimated accurately enough to provide a
useful solution to the problem of how much safety stock to hold when no
cost of delay is involved.
A decision on whether to stoch an item at a local activity can be
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made using this critical ratio. If a repair part, for example, has a
probability of .64 that one or more units will be demanded, th4n the
probability that less than one unit will be demanded is .36. A critical
ratio of .33 for this item would indicate that it cannot economically
be stocked at the local activity.
A decision can also be made for the correct amount of safety stock
to hold for items that obviously should be stocked because of past usage.
A critical ratio of .50 or less for these items would indicate that no
safety stock is justified and the reorder point should only consider the
demand over lead time.






1C = incremental cost of transportation or purchase price
SP = standard NSF price
HC = holding cost
Qm = Order quantity in months of stock (or simply 1.0 in the
case of an insurance item)
Considered in the light of all other factors being equal, we make
the following observations.
1. An extremely low price for an item will make the "denominator"
of our "critical ratio" small and justify larger safety stocks.
2. A heavy, bulky item will cause the "numerator" to become large
because of transportation charges. This also supports larger safety stocks
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3. An extremely high unit price for an item would decrease our
justification for safety stocks considerably.
4. A relatively light and compact item would mean that less safety
stock would be justified.
5. A high obsolescence rate would lower safety levels. When one
considers the vast differences that exist in individual items of Navy
Stock Fund material, a safety level policy that assumes a number of
characteristics to be equal for all items should probably be question-
ed by the budgeteers.
Prerequisite to the design of inventory management systems
and sub-systems is a detailed and thorough study of the char-
acteristics of the individual line items that make up the total
inventory. Unfortunately, item analysis invariably reveals
the inventory to be not one large homogenious group of items,
but a number of homogenious groups, each of which for manage-
ment purposes bears little relationship to the other groups...
Whatever the groups, a study must be made of each to
determine optimum management policies for each group. Then a
determination must be made to establish those policies which
can be applied in common to a majority of the groups and those
applicable to only a specific group. At this point the struct-






SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Summary
After proving its practicality and efficiency in the area of common-
use commodities for more than fifty years, the stock fund concept of
supply was significantly expanded some eight years ago to include such
slow-moving items as repair parts. It i^as realized at that time that
obsolescence and pricing problems would be encountered and that stock
turn would be slow for these items. The advantages of stock funding,
however, were considered to outweigh those shortcomings.
Recent reductions in cash, coupled with the requirements of sup-
porting increasingly complex and expensive equipment, have resulted in
a serious financial problem for the fund. Local activity inventory
investment in many material cogs is currently limited to two and a half
times the monthly value of issues. Throughout the whole system, pro-
curement funds are too limited to support new programs, replenish issued
material, and provide the level of supply availability that the managers
of the Navy Stock Fund deem desirable. The reduction of working capital
can be attributed to three recent developments:
1. A vast amount of money has been diverted since the mid-1950's
from ^excess" operating capital through the reapportionment progress to
other programs and uses (to other appropriations).
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2. The capitalization of repair parts into the stock fund in 1957
created problems in obsolescence and pricing. Annual operating losses
since that date have been significant.
3. Transfers of money and material to the newly established De-
fense Stock Fund in 1962 and 1963 caused an immediate loss of cash as
well as future sales.
The central issue in current financial problems appears, however,
to be associated primarily with the large inventory investment required
to provide a high level of repair parts support for today's complex
equipments. The relatively unpredictable demand for these items, coupled
with a decentralized stocking policy, requires a considerable amount of
safety stock. The resulting stock turn ratio for this segment of stock
fund inventories is much lower than the Department of Defense budget
analysts consider satisfactory.
An apparent need is some method of determining, on an economic
basis, the level of support that can be justified. A possible approach
to this problem was discussed by the writer.
2. Conclusions
Traditionally, improvements in inventory management techniques
have been made in times of adverse conditions. In this respect the
current financial situation of the Navy Stock Fund may not be all bad.
Great strides have recently been made in Lhe area of selective item
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management . Variable stock level programs, for example, have shown that,
by concentrating attention upon the single characteristic of each line
item's annual dollar demand, significant reductions in inventory invest-
ment can be made without adding to the current workload. Such iuiprove-
ments are not always a blessing, thou- h. Management improvements gained
throuj h a reduction in working capital tend to cause anticipations of
even greater advancements if funds are further reduced. This effect is
no doubt magnified by an urgent need of funds for other programs.
In addition, there is apparently a widespread belief at higher
budgetary levels that the current investment in safety stocks for slow-
moving repair parts is both unproductive and unjustified. Reductions
in working capital are felt in this segment of the stock fund first,
since the replacement of fast-moving stocks is mandatory. The funding
of repair parts for new programs and for replacing issued materials in
this area has been significantly below what inventory managers would
have desired in recent years. Working capital reductions, it is con-
cluded, are but control devices used to reduce both the range and
depth of Navy Stock Fund coverage in repair parts.
There is the added factor of obsolescence losses, attributable
primarily to the inclusion of repair parts into stock fund inventories,
that threatens the revolving concept of the fund and adds incentives
to further reduce investments in insurance stocks.
The higher level budget analysts, however, are considered to have
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good reason to question the need for such a large investment in repair
parts inventories. No concerted attempt has apparently ever been made
to determine an optimal level of supply availability that should be
provided for the various categories of material that are included in
stock fund inventories. The Navy's policy of stocking all items with
possible demand in decentralized locations near the ultimate consumers
is also questionable from an economic standpoint.
In short, it is concluded that further reductions will be made
in Navy Stock Fund working capital. Lacking any economic basis to
"prove" what safety levels of stocks should be at local activities,
inventory managers can expect an "across the board" reduction in stock
availability in the future.
3. Recommendations
1. Efforts should be made to determine on an economic basis optimal
safety levels for the various "groupings" of material in the Navy Stock
Fund.
Just as annual dollar demand pointed the way to reducing the invest-
ment in operating levels, other item characteristics appear to be the
determinants of safety stock levels. Treating all other factors as
equal except unit demand and annual dollar demand fails to onsider
whether the same item or an acceptable substitute can be locally purchas-
ed, the expected additional transportation cost of an interim recuisition,
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or the obsolescence risk involved. Certainly all stock fund items are
not as homogenious as the current methods of computing reorder points
would imply.
2. The Navy's policy of decentralized storage for high cost, low
demand repair parts should be reviewed.
If adequate transportation arrangements can be secured that would
provide prompt delivery of requested parts from a centralized location,
it would appear that significant reductions of repair parts inventories
could be made. Item character is Lies of demand, unit price, and weight
and cube should be the important factors to consider in such a sttjdy.
3. A variable stock level program similar to the FMSO VSL program
should be developed for manual supply activities.
Non-mechanized activities are currently operating under a severe
handicap. Functions that were once handled by Navy ECP's have been
imposed upon these activities at the same time that inventory investment
levels were being reduced. Manual activities, lacking the resources
to cope with such problems, are in need of a centrally developed select-
ive item requisitioning system (BOQ) that will permit reducing inven-
tory investments 'without increasing workload. Consideration should be
given to establishing a central servicing organization to review the
annual dollar demand data from these activities and provide them with





4, Studies should be conducted to determine the feasibility of
estimating demand distributions at manual stock points by rank ordering
historical demand data.
A fixed monthly safety stock policy has the disadvantage of pro-
tecting items with relatively constant demand to a greater extent than
is necessary. Items with fluctuating demands are not adequately pro-
tected against stockout under such a policy. Conventional methods of
determining demand distributions necessary to establish variable safety
levels require entirely too many calculations for a manual activity to
perform. Simulations with actual demand data are recommended to determine
what effects the rank order method of estimating demands would have on
investment levels and stock availability under various administratively
assigned service :;oals. The results of these studies should be compared
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